








Over 20 years ago, in United States v. Wells, the Supreme Court held
that 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which criminalizes false statements to financial
institutions, does not contain a materiality requirement. Justice Stevens
issued a forceful dissent, arguing that the Court’s holding created the risk
that foolish borrowers could be imprisoned for minor falsehoods or even
mere flattery. This Article explores the enduring, and at times unexpected,
effects and implications of Wells. In particular, this Article addresses the
application of Wells to the wave of mortgage fraud cases following the
2007–2008 financial crisis and Great Recession. This Article uses Judge
Posner’s decision for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Phillips to
illustrate doctrinal and public policy issues that persist under the current
mortgage law regime. Almost two decades after Wells, Posner, the once
hard-hearted leader of the law and economics movement, expressed
sympathy for hapless mortgage fraud borrowers exploited by lenders and
mortgage brokers. More than anything else, it is evident that the legal
system has failed to distinguish adequately between borrowers who truly
are deserving of criminal sanctions, and those for whom civil liability and
other negative financial consequences would be sufficient punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
There is widespread agreement that a tremendous increase in various
forms of fraud and white collar crime played a key role in causing or
exacerbating the 2007–2008 financial crisis that led to the Great
Recession.
1
This Article addresses one particular type of financial
wrongdoing—knowingly misleading lenders into making mortgage loans
based on false information, a criminal offense that has been referred to as
“mortgage fraud.”
2
As the Seventh Circuit observed: “charges of mortgage
fraud . . . mushroomed in the wake of the collapse of the housing and credit
1. See David O. Freidrichs, Wall Street: Crime Never Sleeps, in HOW THEY GOT
AWAY WITH IT: WHITECOLLARCRIMINALS AND THE FINANCIALMELTDOWN 3, 7 (Susan Will,
Stephen Handelman & David C. Brotherton eds., 2013) (“The term crime has been widely
applied to the activities of individuals and institutions regarded as having played a central
role in causing the financial crisis.”); but see Ellen S. Podgod, White-Collar Crime and the
Recession: Was the Chicken or Egg First?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 222 (contending that
“there is uncertainty about whether white-collar criminality caused the recession”).
2. The meaning of the term “mortgage fraud” and the connections between mortgage
fraud and the Great Recession are examined in great detail in Matthew A. Edwards, The
Concept and Federal Crime of Mortgage Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57 (2020)
[hereinafter Edwards,Mortgage Fraud].
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bubbles in the period 2006 to 2008.”
3
In the absence of a federal criminal
statute specifically barring mortgage fraud,
4
federal prosecutors routinely
charge borrowers, brokers and assorted white collar conspirators under the






as well as conspiracies to commit such frauds.
8
There is, however, an alternative route to criminal liability for
misrepresentations in loan applications: 18 U.S.C. § 1014,
9
which
criminalizes certain false statements to statutorily specified financial
institutions.
10
One treatise explains the vital importance of this provision to
federal prosecutors:
Section 1014 has always been a popular statute with prosecutors
3. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S
EFFORTS TO ADDRESSMORTGAGE FRAUD 45 (2014) (asserting that “the number of mortgage
fraud convictions more than doubled from FY 2009 to FY 2010, i.e., from 555 to 1,087
convictions, and then increased further in FY 2011 to 1,118 convictions”). Not all of the
cases to which Cole is referring may involve falsehoods on mortgage loan applications.
4. See Edwards, Mortgage Fraud, supra note 2, at 85 (“Although the federal code
currently contains over 4,000 crimes and over 300 fraud and misrepresentation offenses, no
federal law specifically defines mortgage fraud.”) (footnotes omitted).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018) provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other
property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years,
or both.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2018) (covering conspiracy to commit mail, wire, or bank fraud).
Mortgage fraud schemes can violate a wide range of additional federal criminal statutes.
See Linda P. Marshall, Making Choices: Charging and Plea Negotiations, 58 U.S. ATT’YS’
BULL. 18, 18–21 (2010) (collecting statutes commonly applied to mortgage fraud schemes);
see also Daniel B. Mestaz, Building a Mortgage Fraud Defense, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 2011, at
18, 21–22 (same); see also Holly A. Pierson, Mortgage Fraud Boot Camp: Basic Training
on Defending a Criminal Mortgage Fraud Case, CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 14, 15 n.3
(same).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2018) (“Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or
report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . any institution the
accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [and numerous
other entities] . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30
years, or both.”).
10. The current text of the statute lists numerous specific entities, including, inter alia,
mortgage lending businesses, institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and State-chartered credit unions. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2018).
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because the elements of a Section 1014 violation are relatively
simple for a jury to grasp and because the proof typically consists
of documentary evidence that is difficult for the defendant to
refute. As a consequence, Section 1014 prosecutions have been
quite common and have resulted in a relatively high conviction
rate.
11
This Article explores the origins and enduring implications of a key
doctrinal distinction between the federal wire, mail, and bank fraud statutes
and 18 U.S.C. § 1014: the Supreme Court has held that § 1014 does not
contain a materiality requirement.
12
The lack of a materiality requirement
under § 1014 permits (in theory at least) federal criminal prosecutions, and
the possibility of rather severe penalties,
13
for immaterial mortgage
application misstatements. The Article proceeds as follows. Part I
provides background on the two Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Wells,
14
and Neder v. United States,
15
which together establish that § 1014
does not require proof of materiality, while the federal mail, wire and bank
fraud statutes all require materiality. In particular, Part I part focuses on
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Wells, and the specter Stevens raised of the
possibility of borrowers being sent to prison for mere flattery.
The remainder of the Article discusses the interpretation and
application of § 1014 in the more than 20 years since Wells was decided.
Part II addresses the oddity of how federal prosecutors have continued to
charge defendants with making “material” misstatements in § 1014 cases,
even though proof of materiality is not required under existing Supreme
Court case law. Part III explores one of the unusual, and likely unexpected,
implications of Wells—its application to immigration cases involving the
possible deportation of those who have been convicted of violating § 1014.
Part IV investigates the application of § 1014’s non-materiality rule to the
wave of mortgage fraud cases following the 2007-2008 financial crisis and
the Great Recession. In particular, the Article uses the Seventh Circuit’s
important en banc decision in United States v. Phillips
16
to illustrate the
doctrinal and public policy issues that persist under the current mortgage
law regime. Finally, Part V of the Article concludes with possible lessons
11. 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
EMBEZZLEMENT § 4:3 (2019).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. The current version of the statute carries a maximum fine of $1,000,000 or 30 years
in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2018).
14. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
15. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
16. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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that scholars, policymakers and practicing criminal law attorneys may take
away regarding current judicial doctrine on mortgage fraud and § 1014.
I. SUPREME COURTDOCTRINE ONMATERIALITY UNDER 18
U.S.C. § 1014
A. Wells and Neder
Fraudulent misrepresentations can give rise to criminal liability,
17
justify voiding a contract,
18
and, of course, provide grounds for civil tort
claims.
19
As federal prosecutors and defense attorneys are well aware,
however, the elements of fraud as a tort do not necessarily carry over to the
criminal context.
20
Most important for this Article, in stark contrast to tort
17. See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 863 (2001) (observing that
there are over 300 federal criminal fraud and misrepresentation offenses).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“If a
party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material
misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the
contract is voidable by the recipient.”). The Restatement § 164(2) seems to distinguish
between fraudulent misrepresentations and material misrepresentations, which suggests that
materiality may not be required for rescission due to fraud. See Emily Sherwin,
Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient
Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1018–19 (2003) (explaining that, under the black letter
law, rescission does not require proof of materiality).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of
inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the
other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.”). Simply put, “[t]o establish fraud in tort, the victim must prove that the
party who committed fraud made a false statement of material fact with knowledge of the
falsity and intent to deceive, on which the victim justifiably relied, and which caused the
victim injury.” Kathleen C. Engel & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Complexity, Complicity, and
Liability up the Securitization Food Chain: Investor and Arranger Exposure to Consumer
Claims, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 353 (2012); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Fraud and
Misrepresentation Claims Against Lawyers, 16 NEV. L.J. 57, 64–65 (2015) (surveying
different state approaches to fraud).
20. Nevertheless, even prominent federal law enforcement officials can exhibit
confusion over the distinctions between civil and criminal fraud law. U.S. District Court
Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.) notably criticized Lanny Breuer, then head of the DOJ’s
Criminal Division, for publicly misstating that prosecutors had to prove reliance in criminal
fraud cases. See JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 311 (2017) (noting that Rakoff “skewered Lanny Breuer
for having mischaracterized the criminal law”); Rena Steinzor, White-Collar Reset: The
DOJ’s Yates Memo and Its Potential to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, 7
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39, 62–63 (2017) (“As for erroneous interpretations of the law,
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law,
21
not every federal crime involving deceit or misrepresentation
requires proof of materiality.
22
Two Supreme Court cases from the late 1990’s form the essential
bedrock for understanding materiality requirements in criminal
prosecutions for so-called mortgage fraud.
23
First, in 1997, the Supreme
Court held, in United States v. Wells, that 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which
criminalizes the making of false statements to certain financial
institutions,
24
did not contain a materiality requirement.
25
Just two years
Rakoff explains that when Breuer was head of the Criminal Division, he claimed
erroneously that the legal standard for proving criminal culpability was not only that a
defendant made a fraudulent claim but also that the other party to the transaction ‘relied on’
what the defendant had said.”) (citing Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No
High Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutio
ns/ [https://perma.cc/DPY6-PD7N]).
21. Both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts
confirm the black-letter law principle that proof of materiality is required to establish a valid
civil tort claim for fraud. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (“Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless the matter
misrepresented is material.”); Michael D. Moritz, The Advent of Scienterless Fraud?
Applying Omnicare to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Claims, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 595,
598 (2017) (“The draft Restatement (Third) of Torts lays out three elements of fraudulent
conduct: a material misrepresentation, intent, and justifiable reliance.”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2014)); Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106
GEO. L.J. 447, 473 (2018) (summarizing the new Restatement’s fraud definition); United
States v. Rosby, 454 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) (“At common law, both materiality (in
the sense of tendency to influence) and reliance (in the sense of actual influence) are
essential in private civil suits for damages.”).
22. At a general level, a matter is material if it is “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of
the item would affect a person’s decision-making.” Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a matter is material if “a
reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in question,” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
538(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977), or “the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining
his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” Id. at § 538(2)(b).
I am not suggesting, of course, that federal criminal law definitions of materiality track
traditional common law tort definitions.
23. There is no official federal mortgage fraud statute and the term “mortgage fraud”
lacks a precise meaning in the legal lexicon. Edwards, Mortgage Fraud, supra note 2, at
83–90 (discussing federal statutes under which mortgage fraud is punished and FBI
definitions of mortgage fraud). This Article uses the term mortgage fraud merely to mean
intentional misrepresentations, with knowledge of falsity, in connection with mortgage loan
applications. With this in mind, the remainder of this Article drops the “so called” qualifier
from its discussions of mortgage fraud.
24. See supra note 10 (listing some of the financial institutions covered by § 1014).
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later, however, in Neder v. United States, the Court unanimously held that
the federal wire, mail and bank fraud statutes all required proof of a
misrepresentation’s materiality to sustain a criminal conviction.
26
How did the Supreme Court come to opposite conclusions in Wells
and Neder? After all, none of the criminal statutes involved in either case
specifically mentioned materiality.
27
Although the outcomes differed, both
cases illustrate “[t]he age-old principle . . . that words undefined in a statute
are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law
meanings.”
28
This brings us to the crucial textual point that undergirded the
Court’s decision in Wells: the applicable statute in that case, 18 U.S.C. §
1014, only prohibited “false statements,” not fraud.
29
In the Court’s view,
the defendants in Wells had not “come close to showing that at common
law the term ‘false statement’ acquired any implication of materiality that
came with it into § 1014.”
30
25. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
26. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (holding “that materiality of
falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes”); see
also Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be an
Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 597 (2005) (“[T]he Neder
Court was unanimous in its finding that mail, wire, and bank fraud required the government
to prove materiality as an element of the offense.”). Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, dissented on an unrelated point concerning whether the trial court’s jury
instruction error should be subjected to harmless error analysis. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30–40
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. See Alexa Briscoe, Mail and Wire Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2013)
(explaining that “[i]n Neder, the Court acknowledged that the mail and wire fraud statutes
make no mention of a materiality”) (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 22–23); CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MAIL ANDWIRE FRAUD: A BRIEFOVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW 7 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41930.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BLT-DAKN]
(“Neither the mail nor the wire fraud statute exhibits an explicit reference to materiality”).
28. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 320 (2012) (“Even though federal law has no common-law criminal
offenses—all federal offenses having been created by statute—the federal courts still look to
common-law meaning.”).
29. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 23 n.7 (explaining that “the term ‘false statement’ does not
imply a materiality requirement”) (citing Wells, 519 U.S. at 491); see also United States v.
Taylor, 808 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]he Wells Court relied on the
plain text of § 1014, which contains no mention of materiality, as well as on the legislative
history of the statute, to determine that there is no materiality requirement”); United States
v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Wells Court “held there
was no materiality requirement in § 1014 because the plain language of the statute did not
expressly include the word ‘material’”).
30. Wells, 519 U.S. at 491. In Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 288 (1982), the
Supreme Court explained that § 1014 was the product of the reduction, in 1948, of “13
existing statutes, which criminalized fraudulent practices directed at a variety of financial
and credit institutions, to a single section.”
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In contrast to Wells, the three federal criminal statutes at issue in
Neder explicitly referred to “schemes or artifices to defraud.”
31
This
textual distinction altered the Court’s analysis. The Neder Court explained
that “both at the time of the mail fraud statute’s original enactment in 1872,
and later when Congress enacted the wire fraud and bank fraud statutes,
actionable ‘fraud’ had a well-settled meaning at common law”
32
that
“required a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.”
33
In fact,
the Court noted, “the common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’
without proof of materiality.”
34
Accordingly, the Court stated:
[U]nder the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the well-
settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses, we cannot
infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that
Congress intended to drop that element from the fraud statutes.
On the contrary, we must presume that Congress intended to
incorporate materiality “unless the statute otherwise dictates.”
35
Therefore, Congress might have the power to create a federal false
statement offense without a materiality requirement (and the Supreme
Court held Congress did so with § 1014), but if Congress uses the term
“fraud,” a rebuttable presumption has been created that materiality is to be
included as an element of the offense.
36
The Neder Court was careful,
however, to make clear that the same conclusion does not necessarily
follow for justifiable reliance and damages.
37
In the view of the Supreme
Court, such elements of common law fraud “plainly have no place in the
federal fraud statutes.”
38
31. Neder, 527 U.S. at 20–21.
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 23 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)).
36. See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, Materiality and the False
Claims Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 842 (2003) (explaining that, under Neder, “a statutory
provision using the word ‘fraud’ but lacking an express ‘materiality’ requirement would be
presumed to have a materiality element, unless that presumption is rebutted by the language
or structure of the statute”).
37. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 24–25 (“The common-law requirements of ‘justifiable
reliance’ and ‘damages,’ . . . plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes. . . . By
prohibiting the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud, the elements of
reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”).
38. Id. at 25; see also United States v. Rosby, 454 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Reliance is not . . . an ordinary element of federal criminal statutes dealing with fraud.”).
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B. Justice Stevens and Specter of Prison for Flattery
Not everyone on the Supreme Court was keen on the notion of
extirpating materiality from § 1014.
39
Justice Souter’s majority opinion in
Wells inspired a vigorous solo dissent by Justice Stevens,
40
who saw little
difference between the many federal false statement statutes containing
express materiality requirements (by his count, about forty-two) and the
many statutes that do not (he counted fifty-four).
41
Justice Souter’s
rejoinder to this point was rather simple: the two categories of false
statement crimes easily can be distinguished—some statutes have express
materiality requirements whereas others do not.
42
And Souter declined to
assume that the inclusion of materiality in the first group of statutes was
surplusage given the Court’s “presumption that each term in a criminal
statute carries meaning.”
43
More important, Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s decision not
to require materiality in § 1014 cases created the possibility of criminal
punishment for minor falsehoods. A recurring “prison for flattery” theme
ran throughout Stevens’s dissent:
44
As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving
39. Prior to Wells, nine out of the ten federal circuit courts to address the issue had held
that § 1014 required proof of materiality. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 486 n.3
(1997) (citing cases); see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (holding “that
materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
statutes”); see also Bradford R. Hise, Federal False Statement Prosecutions: The Absurd
Becomes Material, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 877, 881 (1998) (noting that “virtually
every circuit that examined § 1014 prior to Wells held that materiality is an implicit element
of the offense”); see also Podgor, supra note 26, at 589 (explaining that “the Neder Court
was unanimous in its finding that mail, wire, and bank fraud required the government to
prove materiality as an element of the offense”).
40. Wells, 519 U.S. at 500–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 505–06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]t least 100 federal false statement
statutes may be found in the United States Code. About 42 of them contain an express
materiality requirement; approximately 54 do not. The kinds of false statements found in
the first category are, to my eyes at least, indistinguishable from those in in the second
category.”); see also Christopher P. Guzelian, False Speech: Quagmire?, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 19, 67 (2014) (“Justice Stevens . . . vehemently dissented in United States v. Wells,
arguing that there was no distinction at common law between false statements, false
representations, or misrepresentations and that the Court was creating an arbitrary, artificial,
implicit standard.”).
42. Wells, 519 U.S. at 493 n.14.
43. Id.
44. See Wells, 519 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress, the Court seems to
recognize, could not have intended that someone spend up to 30 years in prison for falsely
flattering a bank officer for the purpose of obtaining favorable treatment.”).
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late at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind
if the loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of
enthusiasm about the results of a football game or an election, as
well as false compliments about the subject of a family
photograph. So long as the false statement is made “for the
purpose of influencing” a bank officer, it violates § 1014.
45
Stevens provided yet another amusing flattery example in a lengthy
footnote,
46
constructing a hypothetical borrower lying about his “sartorial
common ground” with a loan officer who (like Stevens) has a penchant for
wearing bow ties.
47
Stevens wrapped up his prison for flattery argument
with the following observation: “Unwarranted confidence in one’s own
ability to ascertain the truth has prompted many a victim of deception to
make the false statement that ‘flattery will get you nowhere.’ It now
appears that flattery may get you into a federal prison.”
48
In response, Justice Souter, writing for the commanding 8-1 majority,
disputed Stevens’s view that, by reading materiality out of § 1014,
unimportant falsehoods now would (or is it could) be prosecuted as federal
offenses. Two intriguing aspects of Justice Souter’s analysis are worthy of
further discussion. First, Souter argues:
The language makes a false statement to one of the enumerated
financial institutions a crime only if the speaker knows the falsity
of what he says and intends it to influence the institution. A
statement made “for the purpose of influencing” a bank will not
usually be about something a banker would regard as trivial, and
“it will be relatively rare that the Government will be able to
prove that” a false statement “was . . . made with the subjective
intent” of influencing a decision unless it could first prove that
the statement has “the natural tendency to influence the
decision.”
49
The Wells Court thus claimed that false statements a borrower
knowingly makes with the goal of influencing a bank are unlikely to be
45. Id. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 512, n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In the interests of
space, the entire bow tie scenario, amusing as it is, is not quoted here.
47. Justice Stevens was quite well-known for this sartorial preference. See Sonja R.
West, Justice Stevens, the Writer, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2017) (noting that one
might hear Justice Stevens “described simply as a polite and humble Midwesterner, bow-tie
aficionado and diehard Cubs fan”).
48. Wells, 519 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Wells, 519 U.S. at 499 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780–81
(1988)).
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about matters that the lender thinks are unimportant.
50
After all, who really
would try to influence a bank with immaterial information? It seems much
more reasonable, according to Souter, to assume that, in most cases, a
borrower will attempt to influence a lender with material misstatements.
Accordingly, when Stevens claims that fools can get imprisoned for certain
silly lies under the Court’s interpretation of § 1014, Justice Souter did not
deny this proposition.
51
Instead, Souter’s basic reply is that the existence of
such lies is factually implausible.
52
Stevens recognized—and disputed—the Court’s factual assumption in
his dissent, challenging the Court’s reliance on “an empirical judgment that




I am not at all sure, nor do I know how the Court determined,
that attempted flattery is less common than false statements about
material facts. Even if it were, the “unusual” nature of trivial
statements provides scant justification for reaching the
conclusion that Congress intended such peccadillos to constitute
a felony.
54
The second fascinating issue raised by Souter’s opinion in Wells
concerns how courts should or do interpret and apply laws that punish
morally blameless or innocent behavior. Souter writes that “an unqualified
reading of § 1014 poses no risk of criminalizing so much conduct as to
suggest that Congress meant something short of the straightforward
50. Generic terms like bank are used here to simplify the exposition. The recipient of
the misstatement under § 1014 need not be, technically, a bank or even a lender. See United
States v. Wade, 266 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “18 U.S.C. § 1014 is not
limited to applications for loans or credit”); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1028
(7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that not all of the entities covered by § 1014 make loans).
51. United States v. Phillips, 688 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J.)
(observing that the Wells majority did not deny the consequences posited by Justice
Stevens), reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Dec. 7, 2012), on reh’g en banc, 731 F.3d 649
(7th Cir. 2013).
52. According to one treatise:
Somewhat more plausible scenarios include the case in which a defendant
overstates his personal net worth in connection with an application for a bank
loan to his corporation, which he is not expected to guarantee. Another example
is the loan applicant who has apparently assumed a false identity and, therefore,
fills out an application with false personal description.
1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND EMBEZZLEMENT §
4:8 (2019) (citations and footnotes omitted).
53. Wells, 519 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
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reading.”
55
This observation suggests that if the Wells Court’s materiality-
free interpretation had indeed dragged too much innocent or morally
blameless conduct into the purview of § 1014, then the Court might have
had to rethink its conclusion about the proper interpretation of the statute.
56
In recent years, possible punishment of morally blameless defendants
has attracted significant scholarly attention, specifically in connection with
mens rea requirements in federal criminal statutes.
57
One prominent
scholar even argues that recent Supreme Court case law plausibly can be
read “as making a culpable mental state a prerequisite for punishment for
all crimes, even regulatory offenses.”
58
Ultimately, the Wells Court,
however, did not directly address whether there are substantive legal or
constitutional limits on the legislative power to punish innocent or morally
blameless behavior. By concluding that the materiality-free (but knowing
and intending to influence) interpretation of § 1014 would not actually
criminalize an excessive amount of possibly innocent conduct, the Supreme
Court was able to skirt the specific issue of whether a misrepresentation
made to influence a lender could ever truly be “innocent,”
59
and more
general questions of how to interpret statutes that seem to punish morally
blameless conduct.
60
55. Wells, 519 U.S. at 498–99.
56. For a discussion of moral culpability and Wells, see John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not
Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1021, 1155–59 (1999).
57. See Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization
of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 69 (2012) (“Outside of the public welfare context, the
Court has been surprisingly active in successfully moving beyond the reach of federal
criminal law those classes of individual defendants who may not be morally blameworthy.
This is accomplished almost exclusively through statutory interpretation by reading in a
mens rea requirement when the statute is otherwise devoid of one.”); John F. Stinneford,
Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 698 (2012)
(explaining that since the 1970s, the Supreme Court “has applied a presumption that federal
criminal statutes require proof of mens rea even where they are silent as to this
requirement”) (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000); Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985);
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978)).
58. Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 573 (2012) (emphasis added).
59. John Shepard Wiley argues that the existing elements in § 1014 are sufficient to
ensure that every defendant convicted under § 1014 will be a “designing liar,” and that
“[d]esigning liars seem morally culpable.” Wiley, supra note 56, at 1157; id. at 1159
(“Though the Wells majority did not use it, another reply to Justice Stevens’s dissent would
be to maintain that white lies and flattery of bank officials are immoral and culpable
conduct, even if only trivially so.”).
60. Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753,
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C. Justice Stevens on Prosecutorial Discretion
One final aspect of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Wells is worth
noting—he astutely noted something that was absent from the majority’s
arguments. Stevens observed that “the Court correctly avoids relying on
prosecutors not to bring frivolous cases,”
61
further explaining: “It is well
settled that courts will not rely on ‘prosecutorial discretion’ to ensure that a
statute does not ensnare those beyond its proper confines.”
62
Put another
way, the Wells majority, to its credit, resisted the urge to press an obvious,
but problematic claim—that borrowers simply could count on professional,
prudent federal prosecutors to refrain from bringing § 1014 cases involving
immaterial misstatements. Prosecutorial discretion will be discussed
further below.
63
D. Justice Stevens’s Coda on Wells in Neder
In one small way, Justice Stevens had the final word on the materiality
holding in Wells. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wells was followed not too long after by Neder, in which the Court held
that the federal bank, wire and mail fraud statutes all required proof of
materiality.
64
Although Justice Stevens now agreed with the majority,
65
he
used the opportunity in Neder to draw continued attention to the now
plainly differential materiality standards:
In my dissent in United States v. Wells, I pointed out that the vast
majority of judges who had confronted the question had placed
the same construction on the federal statute criminalizing false
statements to federally insured banks, 18 U.S.C. § 1014. I repeat
this point to remind the Congress that an amendment to § 1014
would both harmonize these sections and avoid the potential
injustice created by the Court’s decision in Wells.
66
842–46 (2002) (providing several arguments against judicial enforcement of principles of
mandatory moral culpability).
61. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 512 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 512 n.15.
63. See infra Part V.B.
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 29 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating that “[t]he Court’s conclusion that materiality is an
element of the offenses defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1344 is obviously
correct”).
66. Neder, 527 U.S. at 29–30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
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Needless to say, Congress never took Justice Stevens up on his
invitation in Neder to amend the federal criminal code to ameliorate any
“potential injustice” wrought by Wells. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (with
respect to materiality) remains the same today as it did when Wells and
Neder were decided in the late 1990s.
II. CHARGINGMATERIALITY POST-WELLS: A CURIOSITY
Approximately two decades after Wells was decided, it remains well-
settled that proof of materiality is not required for § 1014 cases,
67
whereas
proof of materiality is required for bank, wire and mail fraud cases.
68
Despite this state of affairs, somewhat strangely, there are numerous § 1014
cases that mention that defendants were charged, indicted or convicted for
making material misstatements.
69
Many of these cases are unpublished
67. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Posner, J.)
(“[I]f you make a knowingly false statement intending to influence a bank, it’s no defense
that you didn’t succeed in influencing it or even that you couldn’t have succeeded.
Materiality is not an element of the offense punished by section 1014.”); United States v.
Sandlin, 589 F.3d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A false statement need not be material nor
relied upon by the bank to violate Section 1014.”); United States v. Kohler, 87 F. App’x
530, 532 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Section 1014 does not contain a materiality requirement.”);
United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 582 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Section 1014 does not require
that a false statement must be material or even mention materiality.”); United States v.
Cornish, 68 F. App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2003) (using the exact same language as in Kohler);
United States v. Swanquist, 161 F.3d 1064, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[M]ateriality is not, and
never was, an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally-
insured bank under § 1014.”).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that wire
fraud prosecution requires proof of “a material statement or omission in furtherance of the
scheme”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018); United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302,
1309 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[t]he misrepresentation or falsehood must be
materially false” for a bank fraud prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1)), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 567 (2017); Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2018)
(stating that mail fraud and wire fraud both require proof of materiality); United States v.
Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1214–18 (10th Cir. 2015) (same).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Benns, 740 F.3d 370, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating that
the single-count indictment charging a violation of § 1014, alleged that the defendant
“knowingly made a material false statement for the purpose of influencing” an FDIC-
insured bank); United States v. Rabhan, 628 F.3d 200, 201 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that the
defendant was charged “for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1014 by making material false
statements for the purpose of influencing a federally insured bank and a United States
agency in connection with a loan to procure a catfish farm in Mississippi”); United States v.
Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2005) (featuring a defendant that was indicted, though
ultimately not convicted, for allegedly for making “materially false statements in connection
with federally insured loans, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”).
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opinions that merely are noting the allegations in § 1014 charging
documents.
70
These courts are not holding that materiality is a required
70. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 785 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating
that the indictment charged the defendant with “making materially false statements to a
financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1014”); United States v. Rogers, 580 F.
App’x 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the federal grand jury had charged the
defendants with, among other crimes, “submission of materially false statements” to a bank,
“in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United States v. Zehringer, 489 F. App’x 980, 981 (8th
Cir. 2012) (stating that the defendant “pleaded guilty to one count of making a material false
statement in connection with a loan application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United
States v. Crook, 479 F. App’x 568, 580 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that the defendant allegedly
“knowingly made a material false statement or report for the purpose of influencing the
action of the Secretary of Agriculture,” acting through entities covered by § 1014); United
States v. Ciocchetti, 422 F. App’x 695, 697 (10th Cir. 2011) (convicting the defendant of
“making materially false statements in connection with a bank loan application, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United States v. Ciocchetti, 330 F. App’x 745, 746 (10th Cir. 2009)
(stating that the defendant “was indicted and charged with four counts of making materially
false statements in connection with bank loan applications in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1014”); United States v. Sankey, 169 F. App’x 484, 485 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the
defendant “was convicted of making a materially false statement to the Farm Service
Agency . . . in connection with a loan” in violation of § 1014); United States v. Gladhart, 68
F. App’x 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2003) (showing that the defendants appealed “their convictions
for making materially false statements” to a bank in violation of § 1014); Blair v. United
States, No. 2:11-CR-3, 2018 WL 794846, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2018) (stating that the
federal grand jury charged defendants with the “submission of materially false
statements . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); Holstein v. United States, No. 2:12-CV-
0214, 2015 WL 1514986, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2015) (quoting one-count information
that alleged that the “defendant, knowingly made material false statements, reports and
willfully overvalued property and security for the purpose of influencing the action” of the
bank); Joyce v. United States, No. 2:09-CR-00256, 2014 WL 7160417, at *2 (S.D.W. Va.
Dec. 15, 2014) (stating that the defendant “pled guilty to one count of knowingly making a
material false statement to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); Powell
v. United States, No. 3:06-CR-189-RJC, 2014 WL 4793232, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 25,
2014) (stating that the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief, had been charged with, inter
alia, “making materially false statements to a bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”);
United States v. Beltramea, No. 13-CR-20-LRR, 2013 WL 5719501, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct.
21, 2013) (noting that several counts in the indictment charged the defendant “with
knowingly making material false statements or reports for the purpose of influencing certain
financial institutions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); Roggio v. United States, No. 11-
22847-CIV-MOORE/GOODMAN, 2013 WL 12177016, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013)
(stating that the grand jury indicted the defendant “on a charge of making and causing to be
made materially false statements to a federally insured financial institution . . . in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United States v. Palma-Hernandez, No. 8:13CR194, 2013 WL
3863933, at *1 (D. Neb. July 23, 2013) (indicting the defendant for violating § 1014 by
“making a materially false statement on a loan application”); United States v. Corbell, No.
08-0075-01, 2012 WL 6098794, at *2 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2012) (featuring a defendant that
was charged with and pleaded guilty to “making a materially false statement to a bank in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United States v. Meisinger, No. EDCV 11-00896VAP
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element under § 1014.
71
In any case, it is odd that so many § 1014 charging
documents would make explicit reference to materiality post-Wells.
In the end, this recurring prosecutorial charging decision presumably
has no legal effect—merely stating that the defendant in a § 1014 action
made a materially false statement need not compel the prosecutor to prove
materiality. As the Supreme Court explained many years ago: “The
insertion of surplus words in the indictment does not change the nature of
the offense charged.”
72
Thus, the required elements of the statutory offense
remain unchanged.
73
Furthermore, § 1014 defendants who are offended at
the mention of materiality in their charging documents conceivably could
make a motion to strike any materiality language from the indictment.
74
To
(OPx), 2011 WL 13134959, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (explaining how the
government alleged that “by submitting a raft of deeds and bankruptcy petitions on behalf of
unknowing parties,” the defendants “made materially false statements that were intended to
deceive federally-insured financial institutions” in violation of § 1014); United States v.
Wilson, No. 07-CR-0092-CVE, 2008 WL 4980895, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 21, 2008)
(stating that the defendant was charged with violating § 1014 by “knowingly making
materially false statements to a financial institution”); United States v. Peer, No.
4:06CR124-P-D, 2008 WL 4635388, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 17, 2008) (describing a
conspiracy to violate § 1014 “involving the making of false material statements”); United
States v. Huffman, No. S1-4:06-CR-352 CAS, 2007 WL 271379, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 25,
2007) (stating that the indictment alleged a conspiracy “to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1014,
involving the making of false material statement”); United States v. Byrd, No. 01-20325-
SHM, 2006 WL 3805666, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 2006) (indicting the defendant on
“two counts of making a materially false statement for the purpose of influencing a financial
institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”); United States v. Kooistra, No. 8:05CR81,
2006 WL 1888685, at *3 (D. Neb. July 7, 2006) (stating that the indictment alleged that the
defendant made “material false statements in connection with a line of credit advance
request . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014”).
71. My research revealed only one post-Wells decision that explicitly and erroneously
includes materiality as an element of § 1014. See United States v. Robinson, No. A-08-CR-
001-SS, 2008 WL 11423911, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2008) (citing United States v.
Williams, 12 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1994)). This unpublished district court opinion cites a
pre-Wells circuit court precedent. The error is only in the recitation of the elements of §
1014—materiality is not directly at issue in the case.
72. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 223 (1953).
73. See Jaben v. United States, 349 F.2d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1965) (explaining that “if
the indictment . . . did actually require proof of an additional element not necessitated by the
language of the statute, the appellant should not be heard to complain” because “[t]he
requirement of proof beyond the wording of the statute would in fact be in appellant’s
favor,” as “[i]t would force the government to establish something not necessitated by the
language of the statute, thereby placing an additional burden on the government”).
74. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(d) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may strike
surplusage from the indictment or information.”); see also United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d
1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that at trial court “may strike from an indictment
allegations which are both independent of and unnecessary to the offense on which a
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do so, however, the defendant would have to prove that the inclusion of the
materiality surplusage in the indictment “is both irrelevant (or immaterial)
and prejudicial.”
75
This would be a difficult hurdle to surmount. The
conventional wisdom is that “[m]otions to strike surplusage are rarely
granted,”
76
and given the relationship between § 1014’s intent to influence
standard and materiality,
77
it might be challenging to convince a trial court
that the use of the term materiality in a § 1014 indictment is an error at all,
let alone erroneous enough to warrant judicial rectification.
In sum, the unnecessary inclusion of materiality in § 1014 charging
documents is a curious trend. This routine charging decision has led to the
state of affairs where federal appellate courts continue to reiterate, as
required by Wells, that proof of materiality is not required under § 1014,
while some federal prosecutors keep charging § 1014 defendants with
making material misstatements. This might lead one to question whether
these prosecutors are, in practice, treating § 1014 as if it does require
materiality, even though the Supreme Court so clearly rejected such a
mandate inWells.
III. SECTION 1014 IN THE IMMIGRATIONCONTEXT
As the Supreme Court decided Wells, it is unlikely that the justices
considered how the decision might impact enforcement of the nation’s
immigration laws. A recent Second Circuit case, however, was forced to
grapple directly with the intersection of § 1014 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
78
In Sampathkumar v. Holder,
79
the Second Circuit, in an
conviction ultimately rests”).
75. United States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 612 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 290 n.34 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Motions to strike surplusage from an
indictment are granted only when the challenged phrases are ‘not relevant to the crime
charged and are inflammatory and prejudicial.’”) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 85
F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also 1944 Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. CRIM
P. 7(d) (“This rule introduces a means of protecting the defendant against immaterial or
irrelevant allegations in an indictment or information, which may, however, be
prejudicial.”).
76. United States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 2006); see also United
States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that “[t]he standard under
Rule 7(d) has been strictly construed against striking surplusage”) (quoting United States v.
Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 930 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert,
Keeping the Indictment Out of the Jury Room, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 2012 (explaining that
“courts tend to be loath to grant motions strike surplusage,” and that such motions “rarely
are granted”).
77. See infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
78. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
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unpublished disposition, addressed the question of whether § 1014 counted





If so, the petitioner faced removal from the
United States following her conviction for violating § 1014.
82
In fact,
according to a recent Supreme Court decision, “removal is a virtual
certainty for an alien found to have an aggravated felony conviction, no
matter how long he has previously resided here.”
83
Thus, the stakes in this
case were quite high.
Sampathkumar argued that § 1014 was not an offense that involved
“deceit,” because the statute lacks a materiality requirement.
84
Sampathkumar relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kawashima v.
Holder.
85
In that case, the Court held that violations of two applicable IRS
Code provisions, both of which made specific reference to materiality,
86
were crimes involving “‘fraud or deceit’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(M)(i) and are therefore aggravated felonies as that term is defined in the
Immigration and Nationality Act . . . when the loss to the Government
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
79. Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom.
Sampathkumar v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2919 (2015).
80. One author notes: “The definition of aggravated felony for the purpose of removing
individuals from the United States has been expanded so that now an aggravated felony
need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.” Diana R. Podgorny, Comment, Rethinking
the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in Immigration Law as Reflected in the Expansion
of the “Aggravated Felony” Concept, 99 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 287, 289 (2009).
81. See Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App’x 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)), cert. denied sub nom. Sampathkumar v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct.
2919 (2015).
82. Sampathkumar, 573 F. App’x at 57.
83. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018).
84. Sampathkumar, 573 F. App’x at 57.
85. Id. (“Sampathkumar relies heavily on Kawashima, which held that the statute at
issue there . . . contained the elements that ‘necessarily entail[ed]’ deceitful conduct: a
falsity, that was material, and knowingly and willfully made.”) (citing Kawashima v.
Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483–85 (2012)).
86. The Internal Revenue Code provides that a person is guilty of a felony if he
“[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains
or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and
which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter,” 26 U.S.C. §
7206(1) (2018), or “[w]illfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the
preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the
internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or
is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge
or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or
document.” 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2018).
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exceeds $10,000.”
87
The Second Circuit rejected Sampathkumar’s arguments regarding §
1014,
88
relying on the same dictionary definition of deceit that the Supreme
Court had used in Kawashima.
89
Justice Thomas, writing for the
Kawashima Court, had explained that when the relevant tax code section
“was enacted, the term ‘deceit’ meant a ‘the act or process of deceiving (as
by falsification, concealment, or cheating).’”
90
The question for the Second
Circuit, then, was whether § 1014 satisfied this understanding of deceit. To
answer this question, the Second Circuit applied the “categorical approach”
dictated by the Supreme Court,
91
“by looking to the statute defining the
crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the
crime.”
92
In other words, the Second Circuit was not interested in whether
Sampathkumar herself had actually engaged in “deceit” in the underlying §
1014 criminal case. Instead the categorical approach requires “looking
solely to the criminal statute and focusing on the minimum conduct for
which there is a ‘realistic probability’ that a conviction will result.”
93
Thus,
87. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 480.
88. The Second Circuit also addressed several additional issues that are not relevant to
the discussion here, including whether the loss amount in the underlying case exceeded
$10,000 and whether § 1014 is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Sampathkumar, 573
F. App’x at 58–59.
89. Id. at 57.
90. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484 (citing Deceit, WEBSTER’S THIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 584 (1993)).
91. See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567–68 (2017) (“[T]o
determine whether an alien’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony . . . we ‘employ a
categorical approach by looking to the statute . . . of conviction, rather than to the specific
facts underlying the crime.’”) (quoting Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483).
92. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483 (citing Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,
186 (2007); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–600 (1990)); Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567–68 (2017) (quoting Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483). Judicial
application of the categorical approach has not been simple. See Christina M. Cabanillas,
The Times They Are A-Changin’: Sentencing in Illegal Reentry Cases and the November
2016 Amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), 65 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 153, 157 (2017)
(“During the over twenty-five years since Taylor was decided, federal appellate courts and
district courts have found it difficult to apply the categorical approach and have often
produced inconsistent results.”).
93. Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court
has explained that a “modified categorical approach” is employed “[w]here a state statute
contains several different crimes that are described separately.” Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 n.1 (2017) (citing Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S.
183, 187 (2007)). In such a case, “the court may review the charging documents, jury
instructions, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar sources to determine the actual
crime of which the alien was convicted.” Id. For a more recent Supreme Court case
exploring the categorical approach and the “modified categorical approach,” see Descamps
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the question became whether § 1014 typically requires deceit.
The Second Circuit proceeded by comparing the tax offense in
Kawashima with the § 1014 violation in Sampathkumar. The court noted
that the tax offense at issue in Kawashima “contained the elements that
‘necessarily entail[ed]’ deceitful conduct: a falsity, that was material, and
knowingly and willfully made.”
94
The Court of Appeals then explained:
“Nearly all of these elements are satisfied here: to sustain a conviction for
violating § 1014, the government must demonstrate that a defendant acted
with the knowledge that the information was false and with the purpose of
influencing the action of the institution.”
95
The Second Circuit’s analysis, however, had put it in a bit of an
analytical bind (though arguably an unnecessary one). The court had set
the tax offense in Kawashima as the baseline for deceit, and that particular
tax crime included materiality, which—as we know—is not a required
element under § 1014. But the Second Circuit neatly extracted itself from
its bind by explaining: “To be sure, materiality is not an element of the
offense punished by § 1014. But the specific intent required by the
statute—that is, the intent to influence the bank—approaches a materiality
requirement.”
96
To drive home the point that the § 1014 standard is
functionally equivalent to a materiality standard, the Second Circuit quoted
at length from Wells, and concluded that “there is not a ‘realistic
probability’ that a false statement sufficient for conviction under § 1014
would be trivial, notwithstanding the lack of a materiality requirement.”
97
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that § 1014 is an offense that involves
deceit.
98
The Second Circuit’s ultimate holding in Sampathkumar is sound.
99
As a district court stated in a later case upholding the Immigration
Service’s determination that the plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization
due to his conviction under § 1014, “making false statements to influence
another party is the epitome of deceit.”
100
It is less clear, however, whether
the Second Circuit in Sampathkumar had to rely on the near-equivalence of
v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).
94. Sampathkumar, 573 F. App’x at 57 (citing Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166,
1172–73 (2012)).
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 484 (1997)).
97. Id. at 58.
98. Id.
99. I am only referring to the Sampathkumar opinion with respect to § 1014. I express
no judgment as to the other issues in the case.
100. Blank v. Johnson, No. 16-60551-CIV-GAYLES, 2017 WL 4346874, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing Sampathkumar v. Holder, 573 F. App’x 55, 57 (2d Cir. 2014)).
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materiality and the § 1014 standard. Undoubtedly, the offenses in
Kawashima included materiality,
101
and the Supreme Court did explicitly
mention materiality in its ultimate determinations in that case.
102
It does
not follow, however, that materiality is a necessary element of every crime
of deceit. That would be a rather overbroad interpretation of Kawashima,
as the Second Circuit implicitly recognized.
103
Perhaps the Second Circuit,
even in an unpublished opinion, did not want to go on the record as stating
that the legal concept of deceit does not necessarily require materiality.
Instead, it was simpler to follow Souter’s teachings in Wells and endorse
the notion, as other courts have,
104
that the § 1014 standard is functionally
the same as a materiality requirement.
105
Accepting the idea that a § 1014
violation invariably will involve material misstatements obviates the need
to determine whether a non-material § 1014 misrepresentation could
constitute deceit.
101. The Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Government had argued “that the
Kawashimas’ convictions necessarily involved deceit because they required a showing that
the Kawashimas willfully made materially false statements.” Kawashima v. Holder, 565
U.S. 478, 482–83 (2012).
102. See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (“Mr. Kawashima’s conviction
under § 7206(1) establishes that he knowingly and willfully submitted a tax return that was
false as to a material matter. He therefore committed a felony that involved ‘deceit.’”); Id.
(“We conclude that Mrs. Kawashima’s conviction establishes that, by knowingly and
willfully assisting her husband’s filing of a materially false tax return, Mrs. Kawashima also
committed a felony that involved ‘deceit.’”).
103. The Second Circuit explained: “With regard to any elements mentioned in
Kawashima still lacking here, the Supreme Court did not hold that all those elements must
be present” for the applicable statutory language to apply. Sampathkumar, 573 F. App’x at
57. The Second Circuit did not specify, however, which elements present in Kawashima
were lacking in this case.
104. See United States v. Mitchell, 528 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
the Wells Court determined that “[t]he knowledge element and the term ‘for the purpose of
influencing’ was enough to narrow the class of criminal conduct in the same manner as an
implied materiality requirement.”); see also United States v. Tierney, 266 F.3d 37, 40 (1st
Cir. 2001) (asserting that “it will be relatively rare that a statement made for the purpose of
influencing a bank’s decision will not relate to a material matter”); see also United States v.
White, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (stating, in dicta, that 18 U.S.C. §
1014 “essentially prohibits making materially false statements to a federally insured bank”).
105. Sampathkumar, 573 F. App’x at 57 (explaining that the intent required by § 1014
“approaches a materiality requirement”).
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IV. SECTION 1014 AND THEGREATRECESSION (ANDBEYOND)
A. Mortgage Fraud and the Great Recession
As Justices Souter and Stevens debated the proper interpretation of §
1014 in the late 1990s, they could not have predicted the calamitous
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 that morphed into the Great Recession,
and the role that various forms of financial malfeasance would play in the
crisis.
106
As one author sums it up: “If the financial meltdown has multiple
dimensions and involves a variety of causes, fraudulent misrepresentations
in many different forms and on many different levels were clearly at the
center of this catastrophe.”
107
A post-meltdown Seventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Phillips,
illustrates some of Wells’s intriguing real-world implications in light of the
events of the Great Recession. Judge Posner used the opportunity in
Phillips to explore the connections between the early 2000s mortgage
market and the financial crisis. Posner’s opinion inspired a heated dissent
from Judge Easterbrook,
108
who disputed Posner’s take on § 1014’s
application to so-called liar’s loans.
109
The debate between Posner and
Easterbrook, who have well-documented differences on statutory
interpretation,
110
has implications that continue to resonate with respect to
106. The literature on the causes and effects of the financial crisis is truly immense. See
Bernard S. Black, Charles K. Whitehead & Jennifer Mitchell Coupland, The Nonprime
Mortgage Crisis and Positive Feedback Lending, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 1, 6 (2018) (stating
that the literature is “too vast to usefully cite”). For the official U.S. government study of
the crisis, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(2011). In the years since the FCIC report was published there have been many dozens of
articles and books devoted to various aspects of the financial crisis.
107. David O. Freidrichs, Wall Street: Crime Never Sleeps, in HOW THEY GOT AWAY
WITH IT: WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS AND THE FINANCIALMELTDOWN 3 (Susan Will, Stephen
Handelman & David C. Brotherton eds., 2013); see also Edwards, Mortgage Fraud, supra
note 2, at 73 (explaining that “prior to the Great Recession, the United States
experienced . . . a toxic mix of wrongdoing related to the mortgage market”).
108. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2013) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
109. Obviously, “liar’s loans” is not a precisely defined legal term. For more on the
meaning of this concept, see Edwards,Mortgage Fraud, supra note 2, at 62–63.
110. See Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case
Study, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1409 (2000) (“In terms of their theoretical writings about
interpretation, Posner (a leading pragmatist) and Easterbrook (a leading textualist) are as far
apart as two judges could be.”). But these differences do not necessarily lead to judicial
disagreement. See id. at 1411 (noting “a resounding absence of evidence that these judges’
sharp theoretical difference has any substantial effects on their judicial votes”). It must be
noted that Farber’s article was published in 2000, and it might be the case that Posner and
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the application of § 1014 to mortgage origination fraud cases.
B. The Phillips Case
1. Background





applied for a mortgage to purchase
a house.
113
Hall was a hairstylist and Phillips was a barber.
114
Initially they
were turned down because their joint income was not sufficient for the
approximately $200,000 that they needed to borrow for the $250,000 home,
and also because Hall had a prior bankruptcy.
115
After their application was
rejected, Hall connected up with an allegedly crooked mortgage broker
named Brian Bowling,
116
who “steered them to a federally insured bank of
dubious ethics named Fremont Investment & Loan,”
117
which specialized





which Phillips alone signed.
120
Phillips also signed an
employment verification form.
121
As Judge Easterbrook’s dissent explains,
the loan application materials: (1) omitted Hall’s name;
122
(2) “attributed
Easterbrook drifted further apart in the later years of Posner’s tenure on the Seventh Circuit.
(Posner retired in 2017.)
111. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining
that “[t]hey had never owned a house,” and “had only a high-school education,” though
“Hall had some college but no degree”).
112. Hall and Phillips married after the events discussed in this case. Phillips, 731 F.3d
at 653.
113. Id. at 650.
114. Id. I am merely recounting the facts here; I do not mean to suggest that barbers
cannot be well-educated or financially astute.
115. Id.
116. Id. (referring to Bowling as “a crook who brokered fraudulent loans”). In another §
1014 case, “Bowling admitted to submitting false loan applications, inflating applicants’
income, exaggerating assets, understating liabilities, falsifying job titles and employment
histories, misrepresenting the sources of down payments, and engaging in silent second
mortgages.” United States v. Johnson, 729 F.3d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). Bowling was
also impeached at trial in that case “with specific instances of untruthful conduct including
forging signatures on loan documents.” Id.
117. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 650.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 655.
120. Id. at 656 (noting that Hall did not sign the application form). Phillips also signed
an employment verification form. Id. at 657 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 657 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
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the combined income of Hall and Phillips to Phillips alone;”
123
(3) doubled
the couples’ combined income;
124
(4) and “falsely claimed that Phillips was
a sales manager at a satellite TV business.”
125
Thus, instead of a borrower
who was hairstylist at J.C. Penney with an income of less than $24,000, the
loan application represented that Phillips was a satellite TV sales manager
with $90,000 in annual income.
At trial, the defendants wanted to introduce evidence to establish that
the mortgage broker, Bowling, told them that the loan documents should be
filled out with Hall’s income added to Phillips’s income on the loan
application, even though he was not named on the application.
126
According to the defendants, Bowling told them that “this was proper in the
case of a stated-income loan because what the bank was asking for was the
total income from which the loan would be repaid rather than just the
borrower’s income.
127
The district court, however, excluded this evidence
as irrelevant, as Judge Posner explained:
The district judge ruled erroneously that if mortgage applicants “sign
something and they send it in, they’re attempting to influence the bank. . . .
They didn’t sign these papers just to put them up on their wall. They
signed these papers with the idea they would go in to whoever and they
would get a mortgage. . . . [If defendant Phillips, who signed the mortgage
application to Fremont] just took the papers and went home, we would not
have a crime. But by sending them in to the mortgage company, she’s met
the requirements of [section] 1014.”
128
Ultimately, Hall and Phillips were convicted of violating and
conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
129
The penalties for their
transgressions were stiff: “The defendants were each sentenced to two
months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release and they were
ordered to pay . . . nearly $90,000 in restitution.”
130
A panel of the Seventh
Circuit affirmed,
131
over Judge Posner’s dissent,
132
but the Seventh Circuit
agreed to rehear the case en banc, “to clarify the elements of the crime and




126. Id. at 653.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 652.
129. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 650.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Phillips, 688 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, 731 F.3d 649 (7th
Cir. 2013) (en banc).
132. Phillips, 688 F.3d at 805–10 (Posner, J., dissenting)
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the wake of the collapse of the housing and credit bubbles in the period
2006 to 2008.”
133
2. Judge Posner’s Critique of the District Court
a) The Basics of § 1014
Judge Posner attacked the district court’s reasoning on several fronts.
But first Posner began with a reminder that it is not enough to demonstrate
that a loan application has false statements to satisfy § 1014.
134
The false
statements must be knowingly made by the defendant with the purpose of
influencing the lender.
135
Both elements must be met for § 1014 liability—
the defendant must have knowledge of falsity and the goal of influencing
the lender. To illustrate the limits of § 1014, Posner used an example of a
wealthy actress lying about her age on loan documents.
136
The actress’s
motivation for lying might be to avoid age discrimination in future projects
should her true age as stated in the documents become public.
137
Such a
borrower is knowingly making a false statement, but she is doing so
without any purpose of influencing the lender. Thus, she cannot be
convicted under § 1014.
b) Knowledge of Falsity
According to Posner, the evidence that the defendants sought to
introduce in Phillips was relevant to both of § 1014’s requirements. First,
their testimony (if believed) could undermine the conclusion that the false
statements regarding borrower’s income were made knowingly.
138
Phillips
admittedly conceded that “Bowling had told them he would add Hall’s
133. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 650.
134. Id. at 651.
135. Id. at 651–52.
136. Id. at 652.
137. Id.
138. Because § 1014 requires that misstatements be made knowingly, Phillips could not
be held liable merely for signing the mortgage application forms, as Posner explained: “The
government does not argue that by signing the form Phillips adopted the false statements in
it that she was unaware of. Nor would that be a plausible reading of a criminal statute that
forbids only false statements made ‘knowingly.’ It is careless to sign a document without
reading it, but it is a knowing adoption of its contents only if the signer is playing the ostrich
game (‘willful blindness’), that is, not reading it because of what she knows or suspects is in
it.” Id. at 656.
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income to Philipps’s in the line for the borrower’s income.”
139
This
admission, however, did not settle the issue for the Seventh Circuit.
Although the plain meaning of “borrower’s income,” may have only
included Phillips’s income, Posner pointed out that Phillips and Hall could
have believed, based on what Bowling told them, that borrower’s income
was a term that had different meaning in this context.
140
And if they
believed in this different meaning of “borrower’s income,” then they were
not knowingly making a false statement to the bank. They were making
what they believed was a true statement given their alleged understanding
of the meaning of borrower’s income. One white collar criminal law
expert, Solomon L. Wisenberg,
141
explains:
If Phillips and Hall believed that Borrower’s Income meant (to
Fremont) Combined Income of the People Repaying the Loan,
then Phillips and Hall were not making a statement to Fremont
that they knew was false. Their state of mind on this point was
directly at issue. Theirs may have been be an implausible story,
but the jury was allowed to hear it.
142
Judge Posner similarly concluded: “It is for a jury to determine what
the defendants understood to be the meaning that Bowling attached to
‘borrower’s income.’ In finance as in law, words and phrases in everyday
use often bear a specialized meaning of which ordinary people are
ignorant.”
143
c) Purpose of Influencing the Lender
Judge Posner went further, however, and also contended that the
proffered evidence might be relevant with respect to the question of
whether the defendants sought to influence the lender. This is a more
139. Id. Phillips claimed, however, that Bowling did not mention that he planned on
inflating the overall income amount and that neither she nor Hall had read or were aware of
the other inaccuracies in the loan application. Id. at 655.
140. Id. at 653–54; see also Solomon L. Wisenberg, 18 U.S.C. Section 1014: Dick and
Frank (Posner and Easterbrook to you) Duke It Out, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2013/09/18-usc-s
ection-1014-dick-and-frank-duke-it-out-.html [https://perma.cc/7MC8-P6AR] (“According
to Phillips and Hall, Bowling told them that, to Fremont Investment & Loan, Borrower’s
Income meant the total income from which the loan would be repaid. They were in essence
informed that Borrower’s Income was a term of art for Fremont.”).
141. Wisenberg is a law firm partner and the author of SOLOMON L. WISENBERG, WHITE
COLLARCRIME: SECURITIES FRAUD (2016 ed.).
142. Wisenberg, supra note 140.
143. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 654.
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radical argument with possibly profound implications. To simplify
somewhat, if a borrower believes, because of what a mortgage broker tells
her, that something that she has put on her loan application will have no
effect on the bank’s ultimate lending decision, then arguably she is not
attempting to influence the bank with her falsehoods. Posner explained:
[A] jury could find that the defendants believed the bank had
approved the loan to the couple, and was telling them through
Bowling what to put on the loan application, or what he should
put on it in their name, and that in complying with his directives
the defendants were not trying to influence the bank because they
knew the bank had already made up its mind to make the loan
and were just following Bowling’s directions, which they may
not have understood. What if he told them that the bank
wouldn’t even read their application, that all it cared about was
having a signed application? Then in authorizing Bowling to fill
in the application the defendants would not have been trying to
influence the bank.
144
Put a different way, Posner asked: “What can it mean to intend to
influence a bank by telling it something you’re confident won’t influence
it?
145
In support of this “influencing the lender” point, Posner provided a
primer on his view of the perilous relationship between liar’s loans—which
were Fremont’s specialty
146
—securitization, and the financial crisis.
147
According to Posner, liar’s loans “were profitable despite the high risk of
default because lenders sold them as soon as they’d made them. Many of
the loans were repackaged by the buyers into ill-fated mortgage-backed
securities whose holders lost their shirts.”
148
“This was musical-chairs
144. Id. at 655.
145. Id. at 653.
146. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 651.
147. Posner asserted that the type of liar’s loans Fremont made “played a significant role
in the financial collapse of September 2008,” id. at 651, and that the collapse of Fremont
was “a harbinger of the worldwide financial collapse that occurred three months later when
Lehman Brothers suddenly declared bankruptcy.” Id. For more on the role that liar’s loans
and securitization played in the Great Recession, see Edwards, Mortgage Fraud, supra note
2, at 62–68.
148. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 651. Many lenders suffered no direct financial loss from the
misrepresentations in mortgage loan applications. See Shaun P. Martin, Legal Winners and
Losers in the Mortgage Crisis, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 245, 245 (2018) (“Given the presence of
widespread mortgage securitization during the relevant period, lenders rarely lost money
from even blatantly fraudulent mortgages. Instead, these lenders originated the underlying
mortgages and promptly sold them to other market participants.”).




[T]here was . . . evidence, consistent with Fremont’s business
model, that the bank didn’t give a fig about the couple’s ability to
repay the loan. It planned to sell the loan, which would then be
folded with many other loans into a mortgage-backed security
that would be sliced and the slices sold around the world, the
premise being that the security would be safe because of
diversification—the mortgages bundled into the security would
be on properties scattered across the United States. A nationwide
collapse of the housing market was not foreseen.
150
Posner’s argument demonstrates the vital relationship between
materiality evidence and the “purpose of influencing” element of § 1014.
Just because the government is not required to prove materiality (i.e.,
whether the misstatement has some probability of influencing the lender),
this does not mean that the defendant’s subjective beliefs about whether the
lender would or could be influenced by the borrower’s misstatements are
never legally relevant.
151
As such, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, although
Wells forbids courts from requiring that the government prove materiality
in a § 1014 case,
152
it “allows immateriality to be used as evidence that the
false statement was not intended to influence the bank.”
153
3. Judge Easterbrook’s Response
Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the initial panel opinion in Phillips,
154
attacked Posner’s suggestion that lenders did not care at all what was on
stated income applications just because they eventually would be
securitized. In Easterbrook’s view, that most certainly was not the case;
rather, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendants in Phillips
knew that the lender cared very much that the income number placed on the
application was high enough to meet the bank’s standards (regardless of
whether the income amount was true) so that the loan could be approved
and ultimately securitized and sold to investors.
155
Easterbrook explained:
149. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 651.
150. Id. at 655.
151. See infra Part V.C. for further discussion of this point.
152. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 652.
153. Id.; but see United States v. Johnson, 732 F. App’x 638, 656 (10th Cir. 2018)
(declining to consider immateriality argument raised for the first time on appeal).
154. United States v. Phillips, 688 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated, 731 F.3d 649, 653
(7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
155. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 658 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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Banks that syndicate their loans do not lose if the borrowers
default—that’s why some didn’t run credit checks on potential
borrowers, and why the phrase “liars’ loans” developed—but
they do care about the representation that the income is high
enough. Without the representation that the income is sufficient,
the loan can’t be syndicated, the original bank would remain on
the hook, and the loan therefore would not be made.
156
Thus, Easterbrook contended that Bowling’s testimony only would
have been relevant “[i]f Bowling told defendants that banks would make
loans with the income line left blank . . . because it would have tended to
show that the defendants did not have ‘the purpose of influencing’ the
lender when they put a number, any number, in the income blank.”
157
But,
according to Easterbrook, there was no evidence that the lender would have




[I]f Bowling told the defendants only that the bank did not care
about the truth of the claimed income, that would not have aided
the defense. To the contrary, it would have supported the
prosecution by showing that defendants knew that the stated
income was vital to the success of the application.
159
Easterbrook’s dissent concluded with a gibe at the judge and scholar
who arguably is most associated with the law and economics movement
(Posner) from a prominent law and economics scholar himself.
160
Easterbrook argued:
The upshot of [Posner’s conclusion] . . . is that crooked brokers
such as Bowling can confer on clients a legal entitlement to
obtain loans by deceit. That’s bad economics as well as bad law.




159. Id. (concluding that everything that happened in the district court was consistent
with the understanding that the “defendants wanted to show that, although they knew that
banks respond to the income stated on the form, they thought that banks don’t care whether
the statements are true”).
160. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, James D. Cox: The Shareholders’ Best
Advocate, 66 DUKE L.J. 467, 473–74 (2016) (“Undoubtedly the most influential work
applying law and economics to corporate law was that of Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel. In a series of articles—and then their classic book . . . they
effectively founded the contractarian school, blazing a trail for later law and economics
scholars.”).
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the rate of interest that will be charged to honest applicants.
161
Before moving on, it is worth remembering that the ultimate question
before the Court of Appeals in Phillips was whether the district court erred
in excluding the defendants’ proffered evidence,
162
and not whether the
government’s evidence was legally insufficient to support a § 1014
conviction.
163
Thus, although the Seventh Circuit reversed, it only did so to
mandate a new trial.
164
In the end, the jury might well have been dubious
about the defendant’s claims regarding what the mortgage broker told them
and how it influenced both their knowledge and mental state.
165
According
to the Seventh Circuit, however, this was relevant testimony that the jury
deserved to hear.
166
V. HOPEFULDREAMERS ORCRIMINALS? LESSONS LEARNED
REGARDING § 1014 IN THEWAKE OF THEGREATRECESSION
A. Is Materiality the Answer?
It would be tempting to conclude that cases like Phillips vindicate
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Wells by illustrating the value of a rigorously
imposed materiality requirement in criminal prosecutions for mortgage
fraud under § 1014. There is little doubt that materiality requirements
serve valuable purposes. In the civil context, Emily Sherwin concisely
explains the general benefit of materiality requirements:
Perhaps the most straightforward reading of the materiality
161. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 658 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
162. In Posner’s view, the district court’s flawed interpretation of the law “warped the
trial,” and that “the judge may have been led by a misunderstanding of section 1014 to
exclude evidence that if admitted might have exonerated the defendants.” Phillips, 731 F.3d
at 650, 652.
163. See United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that “Phillips did not concern a sufficiency of the evidence issue”). Cf. United States v.
Vargas, 629 F. App’x 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Phillips and upholding
convictions for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud—as opposed to § 1014—based
upon the sufficiency of the evidence).
164. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 657 (reversing and remanding for a new trial after holding that
“[t]he erroneous exclusion of evidence favorable to the defendants could thus have been
decisive in the jury’s decision to convict”).
165. Judge Easterbrook also argued that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to
convict Phillips and Hall, even disregarding the evidence that the district court excluded.
Phillips, 731 F.3d at 657–58 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1036 (8th ed. 2017)
(discussing this evidentiary issue).
166. Ultimately, the government decided not to re-try Phillips and Hall.
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requirement is that some fraudulent misrepresentations, even if
deliberate, believed, believable, and acted on in fact, should not
have legal consequences. In other words, materiality is a de
minimus limitation, marking off a zone in which proven fraud is
tolerated by law.
167
Materiality arguably is even more important in criminal cases.
168
One
scholar, Timothy Todd, explains that “criminal statutes without robust
materiality and specificity invite ‘abuse on the part of prosecuting officials,




The ability to stack (or multiply) charges, which compounds the
potential sentence, “allows prosecutors to pressure defendants to
settle rather than to fight, to enter a plea bargain that admits guilt
(whether it truly existed or addressed conduct that was truly
wrongful in any meaningful sense), and to take a small
punishment.”
170
There is no doubt that materiality matters. But, as important as that
point is, it might not be exactly the right lesson here. As the Supreme
Court recently explained: “Under any understanding of the concept,
materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the
recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’”
171
Thus, even if § 1014
required proof of materiality, it is likely that prosecutors would not have
had much difficulty in proving in Phillips that doubling the borrower’s
income on a loan application and changing one’s job from J.C. Penney
hairdresser to a satellite TV business sales manager were both pretty
167. Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and the
Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2003).
168. At the very least, “[w]hen materiality is included as an element of a statute, it serves
to narrow the range of conduct that is subject to prosecution.” Podgor, supra note 26, at
594.
169. Timothy M. Todd, The Pernicious Effect of Dubious Materiality, 12 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 315, 323 (2018) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974)).
170. Id. at 332 (quoting Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative
Regulations, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 11, 23–24 (2014)). In the context of § 1014, prosecutors might use
the threat of prosecution under § 1014 to pressure defendants who might not be the primary
targets of a law enforcement investigation to provide information on co-conspirators.
Another possibility is that § 1014 might be used to extract guilty pleas from defendants who
are also under investigation for crimes that do require proof of materiality, such as bank,
mail and wire fraud, and thus might be harder to prosecute successfully.
171. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (citing
26 RICHARDA. LORD, WILLISTON ONCONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)).
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material misstatements.
172
This is not to say that misrepresentation statutes
ought not have materiality requirements, but rather that Phillips and similar
mortgage fraud cases are not ideal examples to demonstrate such a point. It
is common for misstatements in mortgage fraud origination cases to
involve significantly inflated income and assets claims and falsehoods
regarding a buyer’s intention to occupy the property securing the loan.
173
It
is hard to imagine any court not finding such matters to be material,
regardless of how we choose to define materiality or how rigorously the
concept is applied in specific mortgage fraud cases. Accordingly, the
lessons, if any, to be learned from prosecutions arising out of the mortgage
fraud explosion is not simply that § 1014’s knowledge and purpose
standard needs to be supplemented with a materiality requirement.
B. Prosecutorial (In)Discretion
Although Justice Stevens argued that the Wells Court’s interpretation
of § 1014 allowed the prosecution of borrowers who did not deserve
criminal punishment, he also praised the majority for avoiding arguments
based on prosecutorial restraint.
174
In the years since Wells was decided,
the Supreme Court repeatedly has addressed the important non-relationship
between prosecutorial discretion and statutory interpretation.
175
Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court in a recent opinion explained:
[T]o rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the otherwise
wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute’s highly abstract general
statutory language places great power in the hands of the
prosecutor. Doing so risks allowing “policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections,” . . . which
172. See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text (discussing the specific
misrepresentations in Phillips).
173. This is also known as “occupancy fraud.” See Erwin J. Shustak, Recent
Developments and Issues in Mortgage Fraud Cases, in MORTGAGE AND FINANCE FRAUD
LITIGATION STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON MANAGING THE COMPLEXITIES OF FRAUD
CASES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS, AND STRUCTURING AN EFFECTIVE
LITIGATION PLAN 59, 66 (2015–2016 ed. 2015).
174. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 512 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hise,
supra note 39, at 901 (“In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Court, quite correctly, did
not rely upon the discretion of prosecutors to avoid frivolous prosecutions.”).
175. See Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 823 n.3 (2009) (“Congress legislates
against a background assumption of prosecutorial discretion, but this tells us nothing about
the boundaries of punishment within which Congress intended the discretion to be
exercised; prosecutorial discretion is not a reason for courts to give improbable breadth to
criminal statutes.”) (Souter, J. for the Court).
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could result in the nonuniform execution of that power across
time and geographic location. And insofar as the public fears
arbitrary prosecution, it risks undermining necessary confidence
in the criminal justice system. That is one reason why we have
said that we “cannot construe a criminal statute on the
assumption that the Government will ‘use it responsibly.’”
176
Scholars similarly contend that “resorting to prosecutorial discretion
to curtail executive branch power rings hollow,”
177
given that “prosecutors
simply have no incentive to ratchet down investigations or screen out
undeserving defendants when liability for morally blameless conduct is so
expansive and the pressure to obtain convictions is so great.”
178
The Phillips case provides a nice illustration of why courts and
scholars believe that we cannot rely on prosecutorial discretion as a
protection against overbroad criminal statutes.
179
Posner’s disgust about
the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute Hall and Phillips is evident
throughout his opinion for the en banc Seventh Circuit. In short, Judge
Posner viewed Hall and Phillips as “hapless victims” of their broker
180
—
who ultimately “turned state’s evidence and was rewarded for helping to
convict his victims by being given a big slice off his sentence.”
181
Posner
was also sure to note that, criminal sanctions aside, Hall and Phillips—like
so many other borrowers in the halcyon days prior to the financial crisis—
176. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2018) (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974), and McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372–
73 (2016)). See also Wiley, supra note 56, at 1058–68 (discussing the decline of
prosecutorial discretion arguments in the Supreme Court).
177. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 380 (2007).
178. Id.
179. This point would not hold for readers who view borrowers such as Hall and Phillips
as morally culpable and deserving of punishment.
180. United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2013); see also KAPLAN,
WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 165, at 1036 (“Judge Posner clearly regards Phillips and
Hall as victims, who were tricked into accepting a loan that would become unaffordable
after two years, after the introductory rate went up.”); Daniel Colbert, Victims or
Fraudsters?: Telling Them Apart in the Wake of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, AM. CRIM.
L. REV. (Oct. 26, 2013, 4:04 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20140302152844/http://w w
w.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/victims-or-fraudsters-telling-
them-apart-wake-subprime-mortgage-crisis-10-26-2013 [https://perma.cc/QG3A-AZTN]
(“In his original dissent, Posner points out that Bowling and Fremont were among the
‘unscrupulous’ actors who helped cause the financial crisis by lending money to
‘impecunious suckers.’”) (citing United States v. Phillips, 688 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir.
2012)).
181. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 651.
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suffered dearly for their folly.
182
After all, the couple ultimately “lost their
home, being unable—despite valiant efforts to keep up their mortgage
payments by working second jobs—to make the monthly payments of
principal and interest required by the terms of the mortgage.”
183
The entire
affair led one commentator to opine that “it is appalling and embarrassing
that any self-respecting U.S. Attorney’s Office would prosecute a case like
this.”
184
In contrast, Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in Phillips did not evidence
any discomfort with the government’s decision to prosecute the borrowers
in this case. Whereas the majority views the defendants as gullible
dreamers duped by a sleazy mortgage broker, “Judge Easterbrook . . . saw
Phillips and Hall as liars and willing collaborators in a scam”
185
—the type
of ne’er do wells who make it harder for honest borrowers to obtain
credit.
186
As Easterbrook summed up the facts: “Had defendants told the
truth, they wouldn’t have received the loan.”
187
The more pertinent question raised by Phillips, might be not whom
prosecutors decided to prosecute in the wake of the financial crisis, but who
federal prosecutors failed to prosecute. The point has almost become banal
by now, but it is “commonplace to observe that no top bankers from the top
financial firms went to prison for the widespread malfeasance that led to
the 2008 financial crisis.”
188
Viewed this way, cases like Phillips provide
ammunition for critics who believe that far too much prosecutorial focus is
placed on minor white-collar crime players, while Wall Street muckety-
mucks routinely evade prosecution and punishment.
189
182. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG&BINDER, supra note 165, at 1036 (“Judge Posner suggests
that it is unjust that Phillips and Hall, after losing their house and their down payment,
should be required to pay restitution to the bank that tricked them into this.”).
183. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 651.
184. Wisenberg, supra note 140.
185. KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 165, at 1037; Colbert, supra note 180
(“Easterbrook’s logic assumes that the borrowers are crooks, or at least sophisticated
financial actors.”).
186. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 658 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that Posner’s
lenity towards borrowers like Hall and Phillips “makes it harder to extirpate liars’ loans
programs, and . . . raises the rate of interest that will be charged to honest applicants”).
187. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 659 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
188. JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES xvii (2017).
189. The classic statement of this position is Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why
Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecuti
ons/ [https://perma.cc/Y3W3-93DE]. For a contrary view that is more skeptical of the calls
for prosecutions related to the financial crisis, see Daniel C. Richman, Corporate
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This need not have been the case with respect to financial malfeasance
in connection with the Great Recession. Adam Levitin, a prominent
financial regulation scholar, surmises that “[b]etween federal bully statutes
like wire fraud and mail fraud and the immense power federal prosecutors
have to coerce plea bargains, it is hard to believe that a determined federal
prosecutor could not have brought a criminal case against either a bank or
its executives.”
190
At the same time, Levitin concedes that it “it is hard to
second-guess” prosecutors who have “direct access” to information about
specific cases.
191
In other words, we might have the intuition that many
powerful, wealthy and well-connected bankers engaged in criminal
behavior prior to and during the Great Recession, but that does not mean
that prosecutors who declined to prosecute such parties did not have
legitimate reasons for keeping their powder dry in specific cases.
192
Nevertheless, it may be upsetting to some members of the public that
prosecutors used their wide discretion to hold off on prosecuting top Wall
Street bankers, while going after borrowers like Hall and Phillips.
193
C. Immateriality and Materiality
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Phillips highlighted an important
tension in § 1014 doctrine regarding materiality and immateriality evidence
in federal mortgage fraud cases. Four related points must be reiterated to
understand the problem. First, as discussed throughout this Article, a
successful § 1014 prosecution does not require proof that the borrower’s
false statements were material. Whether or not a borrowers’ misstatements
would be likely to influence a bank or lender need not be established by
prosecutors in a § 1014 case. Second, a defendant may violate § 1014 even
if the bank does not rely on the misstatements and the lender suffers no
financial harm.
194
Proof of harm or reliance are just not required under §
Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 265 (2014) (arguing that “a focus on
headhunting will only distract from, and reduce the pressure for, efforts to explain the
collapse and prevent its recurrence”).
190. Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2028 (2014).
191. Id.
192. See Richman, supra note 189, at 275 (discussing the challenges of identifying
specific responsible individuals to prosecute under existing federal criminal law).
193. See Colbert, supra note 180 (“One would hope that prosecutors would consider the
sophistication of the borrowers before prosecuting.”)
194. See United States v. Sandlin, 589 F.3d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A false statement
need not be material nor relied upon by the bank to violate Section 1014.”).
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1014, though defendants often try to make such arguments.
195
Third, and
related to the first two points, a borrower may violate § 1014 even if the
lender itself is involved in the mortgage fraud scheme or bank employees
conspired with the borrowers.
196
The Fifth Circuit has explained the public
policy behind this position:
While it is undoubtedly true that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 benefits
various financial institutions, the law’s ultimate beneficiary is the
United States. False statements given to insured banks have the
potential to mislead the auditors charged with maintaining the
federal standards. The government’s interest in maintaining the
vitality of its insurance programs mandates that all material false
statements violate § 1014, even when the false statements are
given with the knowledge, consent or duplicity of a bank
officer.
197
Fourth, despite the three points summarized above, § 1014 does
require proof that the borrower had the subjective intent to influence the
lender. Knowingly making a false statement to the lender alone does not
violate § 1014. Thus, borrowers may want to introduce evidence, as odd
and counterintuitive as this might seem, that they knew or believed that the
lender would not be influenced by their misstatements. Such proof might
show that the borrower did not have the subjective intention of influencing
the lender.
198
As one treatise explains: “A defendant who knew, or
195. See 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
EMBEZZLEMENT § 4:18 (2019) (explaining that lack of bank reliance is a “popular but
unsuccessful argument advanced by many defendants” in § 1014 cases).
196. See 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
EMBEZZLEMENT § 4:17 (2019) (explaining that “complicity” of bank officers is not a valid
defense in a § 1014 case, even where “the bank officer encouraged the defendant to submit
the false statement”) (collecting cases); see also Colbert, supra note 180 (“Because the
statute does not require that the borrower intend to harm the bank, but only that he intend to
influence it, it does not ‘immunize a party from criminal liability because an officer of the
bank was involved in the fraudulent scheme.’”) (quoting United States v. Braverman, 522
F.2d 218, 223 (7th Cir. 1975)).
197. United States v. Bush, 599 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1979); Colbert, supra note 180
(“Though one of the effects of the statute is that banks are protected from false statements,
its central goal was the vitality of the government’s deposit insurance programs, which is
only served if the statute also bans statements that the bank knows are false.”) (citing Bush,
599 F.2d at 75).
198. One criminal defense attorney makes this point on his firm’s blog:
If your client’s loan was a “liar’s loan” (i.e. stated income loan, where the lender did not
verify the borrower’s income), what was your client told by the mortgage broker or lender
representative? If your client was told it doesn’t matter what his or her income really was,
then the false part of your client’s statement was not made to influence the bank.
Carl Gunn, Materiality and Intent to Influence in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 Prosecutions, KMBL
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believed, at the time he submitted the false statement that the bank would
not rely upon it would have a good jury argument that his knowledge or
belief negates an element of the offense: the intent on his part to influence
the bank.”
199
Accordingly, as Judge Posner explained in Phillips,
200
immateriality evidence, which may involve proof regarding the lender’s
own wrongdoing, may be used for the purpose of showing that the
defendant lacked the subjective intent to violate § 1014.
201
Prosecutors naturally will recoil at the prospect of defendants
introducing proof regarding a lender’s dubious business practices, such as
routine disregard of troubling information contained in borrowers’
mortgage applications,
202
or even a bank’s employees’ active participation
in generating falsehoods found in such documents.
203
Prosecutors, and
perhaps even federal court judges,
204
will view this as a sneaky way of
LAW (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.kmbllaw.com/materiality-and-intent-to-influence-in-18-u-
s-c-%c2%a7-1014-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/AEW6-3S6T].
199. 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES: FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
EMBEZZLEMENT § 4:18 (2019). As noted earlier, Posner asked, rhetorically: “What can it
mean to intend to influence a bank by telling it something you’re confident won’t influence
it?” United States v. Phillips, 731 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2013).
200. Phillips, 731 F.3d at 652 (stating that Wells “allows immateriality to be used as
evidence that the statement was not intended to influence the bank” in § 1014 cases).
201. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 165, at 1036 (explaining that
“materiality to a decision would provide some evidence of an intention to influence” a bank
decision, and that “the absence of materiality would provide some evidence against
intention to influence”).
202. One recent article uses the term “willful blindness” to capture this phenomenon.
See Bernard S. Black, Charles K. Whitehead & Jennifer Mitchell Coupland, The Nonprime
Mortgage Crisis and Positive Feedback Lending, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 1, 37 (2018) (arguing
“that market participants were willfully blind at all stages of the lending, structuring, and
purchase chain” for mortgage-backed securities).
203. The conventional wisdom is that borrowers, brokers and lenders all bore some
responsibility for the pervasive falsehoods found in so-called liar’s loans applications prior
to the Great Recession, though “there are numerous examples where mortgage brokers or
originators may have falsified income information by borrowers without the borrowers’
knowledge.” Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage
Applications During the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1831, 1863
(2017). This issue is discussed in Edwards, Mortgage Fraud, supra note 2, at 64–66; see
also KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 165, at 1031 (“During the mortgage bubble
preceding [the Great Recession of 2008], banks often encouraged borrowers to make false
statements either because rising real estate prices lulled them into underestimating the cost
of bad loans, or because they intended to pass these costs on to other institutions—who may
have been deceived or who may also have been eager to pass the hot potato of fraudulent
loans on to someone else.”).
204. Judge Easterbrook’s initial panel opinion in Phillips is an example of judicial
skepticism on this score. United States v. Phillips, 688 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“Phillips and Hall are not the first defendants to argue that they should be acquitted
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trying to evade the first three propositions above, that in § 1014 cases: (1)
prosecutors do not need to prove materiality;
205
(2) prosecutors need not
prove reliance or damages; and (3) a lender or bank’s own culpability is not
a defense.
206
Undoubtedly, one real concern—legal doctrine aside—is that
jurors who believe that lenders and brokers are the true villains in a
mortgage fraud case (or just generally villainous) might be inclined
towards acquittal, even if as a matter of law banker wrongdoing is not a
defense for borrowers. In one case involving mortgage loan
misrepresentations brought under the federal wire fraud statute (as opposed
to § 1014), the Ninth Circuit stated:
We understand the desire to see lenders shoulder responsibility
for their role in the mortgage crisis of the last decade. . . .
However, that does not mean that lenders can be victimized by
intentional fraudulent conduct with impunity merely because the
lenders were negligent, or even because the lenders intentionally
disregarded the information in a loan application. Two wrongs
do not make a right, and lenders’ negligence, or even intentional
disregard, cannot excuse another’s criminal fraud.
207
The essential point, though, is that evidence of the lender’s practices
(whether foolish or criminal) could in some cases undermine the
conclusion that the borrower believed that her misstatements would
influence the lender’s decisions. And, ultimately, the borrower’s subjective
intent to influence the bank is a question for the jury to decide.
because, although they lied to a bank, they thought that the bank cared only about
paperwork and not about the truth of their representations.”).
205. For example, in United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 WL 3545206
(E.D. Va. July 16, 2014), the district court explicitly distinguished Phillips and granted the
government’s motion to exclude evidence related to materiality, explaining that there was
“no evidence in the record that Defendants had any inkling of the materiality of their
allegedly false statements at the time they were made.” Id. at *1. The court further
precluded the defendants from “testifying as to their opinion of the allegedly false
statements’ materiality because their opinions as to materiality are irrelevant.” Id. On the
other hand, the court held that the defendants could “testify that they did not intend to
influence the financial institutions.” Id. (citations omitted).
206. In upholding convictions for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, the Third
Circuit contended that “asserted lender recklessness . . . has no bearing on the defendants’
awareness of misrepresentations on the loan applications. That is, whether the lenders were
reckless in approving loans simply does not make the defendants’ knowledge any more or
less probable.” United States v. Vargas, 629 F. App’x 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2015). Although
Vargas did not involve § 1014, it does reflect judicial skepticism for such arguments.
207. United States v. Lindsey, 850 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
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D. Differentiating Fraud for Housing
There is a final lesson to be considered regarding the application of §
1014 to federal mortgage fraud cases: it may be problematic that federal
law does not recognize in any formal way the distinction between fraud for
housing and fraud for profit.
208
Both types of mortgage fraud may violate §
1014.
209
As the FBI explains: “Fraud for profit aims not to secure housing,
but rather to misuse the mortgage lending process to steal cash and equity
from lenders or homeowners.”
210
Fraud for housing, by contrast, occurs
when mortgage loan applicants
commit fraud . . . in order to acquire property that they intend to
maintain as a homeowner, and often carry out the fraud by
making misrepresentations about their income and other
information relevant to their credit rating, in order to obtain a
loan that they intend to—and often do—fully repay.
211
Although they do not have the force of law, the FBI’s two categories
of mortgage fraud usefully draw attention to the question of which forms of
mortgage origination fraud truly are the most pernicious and deserving of
criminal punishment.
212
The FBI, for its part, always has contended that
mortgage fraud for profit schemes are far more harmful and deserving of
208. The FBI’s two-category classification of mortgage fraud into fraud for profit and
fraud for housing is “referenced in almost every book and article on the topic.” Edwards,
Mortgage Fraud, supra note 2, at 88 (collecting numerous sources).
209. Depending on the particular facts, misrepresentations to banks or lenders may also
violate the federal wire, mail and bank fraud statutes.
210. Financial Institution/Mortgage Fraud, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-c
ollar-crime/mortgage-fraud (last visited on Jan. 24, 2019).
211. Gabrielle A. Bernstein, The Role of Expectations in Assessing Intended Loss in
Mortgage-Fraud Schemes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 337, 341; see also FBI, 2008 MORTGAGE
FRAUD REPORT: “YEAR IN REVIEW” (2008), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/m
ortgage-fraud-2008 [https://perma.cc/86XB-3B9D] (“Fraud for property/housing entails
misrepresentations by the applicant for the purpose of purchasing a property for a primary
residence. This scheme usually involves a single loan. Although applicants may embellish
income and conceal debt, their intent is to repay the loan.”).
212. Arguably, the Seventh Circuit in Phillips implicitly recognized the distinction
between fraud for housing and fraud for profit, though some might think that Posner’s
majority opinion twisted the law to reach what the Court of Appeals believed was an
equitable result. See Colbert, supra note 180 (“[W]hen an overzealous prosecutor brings a
case against borrowers, allowing the jury to consider the possibility that the borrowers were
unwitting victims can adapt § 1014 to fit the realities of the subprime market.”); id.
(“Posner’s approach – allowing the jury to hear evidence that a mortgage broker misled the
borrowers – may not fit well with existing precedent, but it offers a way to distinguish
fraudsters from their victims.”).
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law enforcement attention than fraud for housing.
213
Nevertheless, this is
merely a professed law enforcement priority, not a statutory limit on
prosecutorial power.
New York’s relatively new criminal mortgage fraud statute provides
an interesting example of how criminal law may differentiate fraud for
housing from fraud for profit. First, the New York statute explicitly
includes a materiality requirement,
214
thus avoiding vexing questions of
whether immaterial misrepresentations can give rise to criminal liability.
Second, and of even more import, New York has an interesting wrinkle—
an explicit exception from criminal liability for borrowers who take out a
residential mortgage loan for a property that they intended to occupy,
215
though they can be held liable as accessories in some cases.
216
Thus, to use
FBI terminology, New York has decided that criminal liability for
borrowers is improper in some cases involving fraud for housing. At the
same time, New York’s mortgage fraud statute still permits criminal
liability in cases of fraud for profit, where the borrower has no plan to
reside in the property secured by the mortgage or intent to repay the loan.
Furthermore, New York’s approach obviously does not protect brokers and
lenders who play an active role in generating the misrepresentations in loan
applications. Thus, there are ways for criminal laws that govern mortgage-
related misrepresentations to show leniency for (arguably) less morally
blameworthy borrowers.
213. See supra note 210 (asserting that “[t]he FBI prioritizes fraud for profit cases”).
214. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 187.00(4) (McKinney 2009).
215. The statute reads as follows: “No individual who applies for a residential mortgage
loan and intends to occupy such residential property which such mortgage secures shall be
held liable under this article provided, however, any such individual who acts as an
accessory to an individual or entity in committing any crime defined in this article may be
charged as an accessory to such crime.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 187.01 (McKinney 2009);
David E. Zukher, 2009-2010 Survey of New York Law: Criminal Law, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
681, 715 (2011) (explaining that the statute provides “an exemption from mortgage fraud for
an individual person who applies for a loan and who intends to occupy the mortgaged
property, other than as part of a criminal conspiracy”) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 187.01
(McKinney 2010)).
216. See William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of
New York, Book 39, Penal Law § 187.00 (explaining that “exclusion of the ordinary home
buyer does not, however, apply if the buyer is acting as ‘an accessory to an individual or
entity in committing’ a ‘residential mortgage fraud’ crime”).
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CONCLUSION
Phillips is an ideal denouement to the Souter-Stevens debate in Wells
more than 20 years ago over the proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
In Wells, Stevens voiced concern regarding the imposition of severe
criminal liability upon foolish bank borrowers. At the same time, Stevens
recognized judicial skepticism about reliance on prosecutorial discretion as
an institutional protection for overbroad federal criminal laws. Two
decades later, in Phillips, Richard Posner, the once hard-hearted leader of
the law and economics movement,
217
in the twilight of his illustrious
judicial career, expresses great sympathy for hapless mortgage fraud
borrowers exploited by mortgage brokers who end up facing federal
criminal charges for their folly.
Justice Gorsuch recently wrote: “History shows that governments
sometimes seek to regulate our lives finely, acutely, thoroughly, and
exhaustively. In our own time and place, criminal laws have grown so
exuberantly and come to cover so much previously innocent conduct that
almost anyone can be arrested for something.”
218
Given the perils of over-
criminalization to which Justice Gorsuch is alluding, we need to ask
whether the legal system adequately has distinguished between borrowers
who truly are deserving of criminal sanctions, and those for whom civil
liability and other negative financial consequences would be sufficient
punishment. That is one of the key issues that Justice Stevens homed in on
in Wells over 20 years ago, and the importance of such matters was
magnified by the subsequent mortgage meltdown and the Great Recession.
As long as politicians, journalists and public policy wonks pound away on
the countless virtues of home ownership, we will have borrowers who are
tempted (or even lured) to get in on what has been touted as a low-risk,
wealth-creating dream machine.
219
Whether or when such borrowers truly
deserve criminal punishment is a question well worth asking.
217. Judge Posner has confessed “that for the first 25 or even 30 years of being a federal
judge [he] did not feel empathy for many litigants.” RICHARD A. POSNER, IMPROVING THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAMS, THE PLIGHT OF THE PRO SE’S, AND THE
TELEVISING OF ORAL ARGUMENTS 253 (2d ed. 2017). Posner goes on to discuss his
softening over time. Id. at 253–54.
218. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1730 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
219. For more skeptical views on the benefits of home ownership, see A. Mechele
Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good
Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009); Georgette Chapman Phillips, An Urban Slice of Apple Pie:
Rethinking Homeownership in U.S. Cities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 187
(2010).
